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244 BRIVIESCA V. CORONADO. [19 C. (2d) 
by se veral cases cited in the Industrial Accident Reports." 
In the Fenton case the Industrial Accident Commission had 
denied compensation to the wife of the employee who was 
killed while investigating applications for relief in behalf 
of. the California State Relief Administration. . The court 
annulled the action of the commission and· directed it to 
make an dward in favor of the wife of the deceased. 
In the present case we are not called upon to hold that 
Lehman was acting within the course of his employment at 
the time of the accident, but only to determine whether there 
was any substantial evidence before the court at the time the 
motion for a nonsuit was made and granted, which tended to 
thow that Lehman at that time was performing such a service 
in behalf of his employer. As we view this evidence,we are 
of the opinion that it was sufficient to have supported a 
verdict in favor of the' plaintiff had the court permitted the 
case to have gone to the jury. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., -Houser, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
27, 1942. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 17152. In Bank. Dec. 30,1941.] 
ANDREA BRIVIESCA, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, 
v. ROSARIO CORONADO, Respondent. 
[la, Ib] Banks-Deposits-Gift of Deposit.-Where a check to 
effectuate a gift was deposited in the drawee bank by the 
donor's agent who opened an account in the name of the payee, 
the deposit constituted payment of the check to the payee 
and completed the gift of the£unds, although the donor sub-
sequently died before the making of the rubber stamp endorse-
ments on the check and the entry of the new account in the 
bank's ledger. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Banks, § 88; [2] Payment, § 8; [3] 
Negotiable Instruments, § 148; [4J Deeds, § 180; [5] Deeds, § 169. 
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[2] Payment-Mode-Deposit ofOheck.-Apayee who deposits a 
check in the drawee bank in his own name thereby receives 
payment of the check. 
[3] Negotiable Instruments-Bills of Exchange - Acceptance-
What Oonstitutes.-An acceptance is a promise by the drawee 
to pay the amount of the bill or check to the holder or subse-
quent holders to whom it may be negotiated; The acceptance 
must be in writing and is usually on the instrument itself. The 
term does not apply to the deposit, of a check in the drawee 
bank by the' payee, in which case. the liability of the bank is 
not based upon the check or any promise to pay it, but arises 
from the relationship of debtor and creditor between the bank 
and the depositor. 
[4] Deeds-Actions-Weightand Sufficiency of Evidence-Iden-
tity of Parties.-In an action by an administratrix to quiet 
title to properties standing in the names of the deceased, L. B., 
and Rosario or Roseta B., and of L.· B.. and Mrs. L. B., the 
court was justified in finding that the defendant and the per-
son named as co-owner were the same person. 
[5] Id.---Actions-Admissibility of Evidence-Marriage to Gran-
tee.-Where a person sues in her ca paci ty as personal repre-
sentative of the estate of L. B., to quiet title to rea.l property 
standing in. the name of L. B., and Mrs. L. B., as against tho 
claim of the former wife, it is proper to exclude evidence 
offered to show that the plaintiff had been married to the de-
ceased. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Riverside County. Wm. D. Dehy, Judge Assigned. Af-
firmed. 
Action by administratrix to quiet title to two . parcels 
of real property and a bank deposit. Judgment for defen-
dant . excepting a' op:e-half interest· in one of the parcels of 
real property, affirmed. 
J ~hn H. Myers for Appellant. 
Gordon P. Shallenberger for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.--:-Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of 
Luz Briviesca, brought this action to quiet title to two par,. 
[3] See 4 Oal. Jur. 186; 19 Cal. Jur. 937; 7 Am. Jur. 313; 8 
Am. Jur. 514. 
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eels of real property and a sum of money on deposit in . a 
bank, claimed by defendant. The trial court. entered judg-
ment for defendant, excepting a one.;.half interest in one of 
the parcels of real property, and plaintiff has appealed,chal-
lenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the 
judgment. 
[1] Luz Briviesca, the deceased, was injured in an auto-
mobile accident. Shortly before his death he stated to his 
employer that he was about to die, signed a check payable 
to defendant for the balance of his bank account, and re-· 
quested the employer to deposit the check to defendant's 
account as her agent in the same bank upon which the check 
was drawn. The employer, acting as agent for defendant, 
entered the bank just before closing time, opened an account 
in the name of defendant by depositing the check, and re-
ceived a deposit ~Iip in the name of the defendant. The 
rubber stamp endorsements on the check· and the entry of 
defendant's account in the bank's ledger were both made 
the following day. The deceased died a few hours after the 
deposit was made. 
Plaintiff contends that the execution of a check in favor 
of defendant cannot constitute a valid gift passing title to 
the funds on deposit to defendant before acceptance or pay-
ment by the bank, and that the death of decedent before the 
check was endorsed or the account entered in the ledger re-
voked the check before acceptance or payment. 
The check, however, was deposited in the drawee bank 
to the account of defendant-payee before the death of the donor. 
This deposit constituted payment of the check by the bank 
to the defendant, thus completing the gift before the death 
of the donor. [2] It is well settled that if the payee deposits 
the check in the drawee bank in his own name, he thereby 
receives payment of the check. (Utah Oonst. Co. v.W estern 
Pacific Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 164, 165 [162 Pac. 631], 
Greenzweight v. Title Guaranty & Tr. Co., 1 Cal. (2d) 577, 
581 [36 Pac. (2d) 186], see cases cited in Brannan's Nego~ 
tiable Instruments' Law (6th ed.), p. 893; 14 Minn.L. Rev. 
284; 2 Morse, Banks and Banking, sec. 451.) In effect he 
receives the money from the bank and immediately deposits 
it therein. (Ibid.) [3] Such a transaction is not an accep-
tance of the check by the bank. An acceptance is a promise 
by the drawee to pay· the amount of the bill or check to the 
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holder or subsequent holders to whom it may be negotiated. 
The acceptance must be in writing and is usually on the 
instrument itself. (Civ. Code, sec. 3213.) It contemplates 
further negotiation of the instrument .. When a check is de-
posited in the drawee bank, it is removed from circulation 
and cancelled. No further negotiation is contemplated. The 
liability of the bank to the depositor-payee is not based upon 
the check or any promise by the bank to pay the check, but 
arises from the relationship of debtor and creditor that exists 
between a bank and a depositor. (See cases cited in 7 Am. 
JUl'. 313, sec. 444.) [lb] In the instant case this relation-
ship came into existence at the time the deposit waS made, 
not at the time the check was stamped and the account posted 
in the ledger. 
[4] The record shows that Parcel I of the real property 
was owned by the deceased, Luz Briviesca, and Rosario 
Briviesca or Roseta Briviesca as joint tenants, and Parcel II 
was owned by Luz Briviesca and Mrs. Luz Briviesca as ten-
ants in common. The trial court found that Roseta Briviesca 
and Mrs. Luz. Briviesca were the same person, namely, the 
defendant in this action. It therefore held that defendant 
was entitled to all of Parcel I as surviving joint tenant and 
to one-half of Parcel II as tenant in common. The other half 
of Parcel I was awarded to plaintiff as administratrix of the 
estate of Luz Briviesca, the other tenant in common. The 
trial court was justified in finding that the defendant was 
the. person named in the deeds as co-owner of the parcels of 
realty in question, and the record contains no evidence that 
plaintiff, as administratrix, was the owner of any more than 
a one-half interest in Parcel II. (See 22 Cal. JUl'. 122, 
sec. 11.) 
[5] Since plaintiff sued in her representative capacity 
and riot as an individual, the. trial court committed no error 
in excluding evidence offered by plaintiff to show that she, 
too, had been married to the deceased. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
